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The  issue  of  the  cooperation  among  private  agents  in  realising  collective  goods  has  always  raised 
problems concerning the basic nature of individual behaviour as well as the more traditional economic 
problems. The Computational Economics literature on public goods provision can be useful to study 
the possibility of cooperation under alternative sets of assumptions concerning the nature of individual 
rationality and the kind of interactions between individuals.  
In this work I will use an agent-based simulation model to study the evolution of cooperation among 
private agents taking part in a collective project: a high number of agents, characterised by computational 
rationality, defined as the capacity to calculate and evaluate their own immediate payoffs perfectly and 
without errors, interact to producing a public good.  The results show that when the agents’ behaviour 
is not influenced either by expectations of others’ behaviour or by social and relational characteristics, 
they opt to contribute to the public good to an almost socially optimal extent, even where there is no 







Economic theory offers many models that explain the free riding dominance in terms of strategic 
rationality, while Experimental Economics presents many experiments where individual rationality, in 
conjunction with other factors, influences the agents’ behaviour in such a way as to produce some 
cooperation, at least in the early phases of the game. 
However,  one  question  remains  unexplained:  whether  (and  how)  agents  without  either  strategic 
rationality  or  social  and  emotional  factors  affecting  their  choices  can  cooperate  and  successfully 
produce public goods. 
The Computational Economics literature on public goods provision can be interpreted as an attempt to 
study the possibility of cooperation under alternative sets of assumptions concerning on one hand the 
nature of individual rationality and on the other the kind of interactions between individuals. By fixing 
the structure of the interactions and by making them as neutral as possible, one can study the evolution 
of cooperation under a variety of assumptions about the agents’ rationality, from “zero-intelligence” 
agents up to sophisticated agents. Alternatively, by fixing the type of individual rationality, there are 
interesting ways to study how the different interaction structures affect the emergence of cooperation. 
This work is concerned with the second type of study. I use an agent-based simulation model to study 
the evolution of cooperation among private agents taking part in collective projects, where a high number of agents interact with a view to producing a public good. Simulation models, in fact, are 
particularly useful to model the agents’ rationality within a world where virtual players interact under a 
given set of rules. 
My virtual agents are characterised by computational rationality, defined as the capacity to calculate and 
evaluate their own immediate payoffs perfectly and without errors.  
The  absence  of  errors  and  the  lack  of  any  individual  strategic  behaviour  or  relational  social 
characteristic, such as kindness, sense of belonging or fear of exclusion
2, give rise to unusual dynamics 
in agents’ behaviour which produce a significantly higher level of voluntary contribution to public 
goods provision than that prevailing in reference models in both Game Theory and Experimental 
Economics.  
My analysis shows that if the agents’ behaviour is not influenced either by expectations of others’ 
behaviour or by social and relational characteristics, they opt to contribute to the public good to an 
almost socially optimal extent, even where there is no big difference between the rates of return on the 
private and the public investment.  
This paper is organized as follows: in the next Section, I introduce some assumptions on rationality in 
public goods provision contexts and, in particular, I define the notion of computational rationality as 
employed in the simulations model. In  Section 2 I briefly describe the reference model. In Section 3 I 
exhibit the simulation findings and discuss the results of the validation tests. Finally, Section 4 contains 
some concluding remarks and suggestion for future research. 
 
 
1. Assumptions on rationality and outcomes of collective action 
 
The use of computational models has been justified by three key aspects. First, computer simulations 
are used aside traditional theory as basic computational tools able to solve the computing difficulties 
arising in multi-equational models. Secondly, simulations are useful in solving more complicated models 
that cannot be solved analytically in an easy or complete way. In this case, computational systems allow 
one to clarify the solution structure by illustrating hidden dynamic properties and testing the influence 
of parameters and assumptions onto the results. Lastly, simulations have found useful applications in a 
certain  class  of  problems  for  which  to  apply  a  mathematical  equation  system  does  not  appear 
immediate or useful (Axtell, 2000). 
Agent-based models are particularly useful to study interaction mechanisms among individuals leading 
to collective outcomes because they are suitable for studying classes of systems characterised by two 
                                                 
2 See Raimondi, M (2009, b). typical properties: they comprise interacting units and possess emerging properties, that is, properties 
which develop precisely from the interaction between agents (Bruun, 2004).  
Since  the  first  applications  of  game-theoretic  frameworks,  Social  Sciences  built  a  robust  theory  of 
cooperation based on strategic rationality and dominant strategies. Subsequently, this theory has been 
supplemented by many theoretical studies based on other perspectives such as Evolutionary Game 
Theory, Experimental Economics and Computational Economics, in order to analyse what are the 
reasons behind the failure associated with the Game Theory predictions and the strategic rationality 
assumption.  
In this Section I present the three kinds of rationality characterising the agents in Game Theory models, 
in the experiments on public goods provision and in my agent-based model, i.e. strategic rationality, 
rationality affected by social motives and computational rationality respectively.  
 
1.1 Strategic rationality 
 
In traditional Economics, the voluntary production of public goods is thought to be doomed to failure. 
Given the two principal characteristics of public goods, non rivalry and non excludability, the individual 
finds it rational not to take part in the production of a public good, but only to take advantage from it 
once it has been collectively produced. 
A  generalized  free  riding  is  the  outcome  that  can  be  predicted  under  the  assumption  of  strategic 
rationality: a selfish agent maximizes his payoff expecting the other agents to be rational as well. Even if 
the  agent  knows  that  the  collective  outcome  would  be  the  Pareto-optimal  solution,  his  individual 
earnings from the provision of the public good are uncertain and the strategy of “no contribution” is 
the dominant strategy whatever strategy will be chosen by the other players. 
The social dilemma is that the Pareto–efficient result for the group (collective action) is doomed to 
failure because of (1) selfish interest prevails and (2) there are multiple problems of uncertainty which 
make  it  difficult  to  evaluate  expected  individual  and  collective  benefits  as  well  as  the  differential 
between costs and advantages of cooperation. Uncertainty is particularly evident in the forecast of 
individual behaviour and the agents are not able to predict others’ behaviours.  
As a result, the most common type of behaviour in consumption and production phases of public 
goods tends to be opportunistic, and even when payoffs are higher, cooperation is less widespread than 
individualistic behaviour. The dominance of this type of individual behaviour leads to the failure of 
collective action or inefficient outcome.  
This outcome is strongly predicted by the hypothesis of strategic rationality. This kind of rationality is 
one of the most common assumptions made in Game Theory, along with common knowledge of rationality. Strategic rationality implies that every player is motivated by maximizing his own payoff (or 
his utility), thus being able to perfectly calculate the probabilistic result of every action. 
In the theoretical decision of static games (where the moves of players are simultaneous) the players 
choose  strategies  that  maximize  expected  payoff  given  some  beliefs  about  others'  strategies  not 
contradicted  by  anything  they  know.  In  other words,  rational  players  always  choose  the  dominant 
strategy, i.e. the strategy that, for every choice of strategy of the other players, produces the greater 
payoff. 
The assumptions
3 of common knowledge and rationality imply that: 
(1) the specification of the game and the players’ preferences among the outcomes, together with 
everything that can be logically deduced about the game, are common knowledge among the players;  
(2) the players are rational in the sense that they always seek to maximize their own expected utilities, 
and this is common knowledge among all players.  
The form of rationality specified in the second statement is usually interpreted as referring to the 
axioms of rational choice under uncertainty
4 while the term “common knowledge”
  5 was introduced 
into Game Theory by Lewis (1969) and later formalized by Aumann (1976). 
To  summarize,  the  standard  knowledge  and  rationality  assumptions  of  Game  Theory  include  the 
assumption that players choose their moves or strategies rationally in the sense of expected utility 
theory and that the fact that they do this is common knowledge. 
The backward induction argument, that leads to the expected outcome of generalised free riding in 
finitely repeated games, also works on the basis of these assumptions. Most theorists, however, find a 
conflict between backward induction reasoning and other kinds of reasoning. Much effort has gone 
into trying to solve the problem. Virtually all of these efforts exploit the extensive-form structure of the 
above games or the fact that they are played over time. 
 
1.2 Rationality in experiments 
 
Experimental economists as well as sociologists and political scientists state that cooperation is possible 
and in fact, we see collective behaviour in many aspects of real life.   
Many experiments specifically test this theory in the finitely IPD (Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Cooper, 
DeJong and Forsythe, 1996) and the Centipede game (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992): they show that 
                                                 
3 For further explanation of these assumptions see, e.g., Colman (1997), Colman and Bacharach (1997), Hollis and Sugden (1993), Sugden 
(1993, 1992).  
4 See, e.g., Savage (1954) that formalizes the axioms of rational choice under uncertainty within a Bayesian framework of subjective 
probabilities. 
5 The Nash Equilibrium concept is justified by reference of the concept of common knowledge. A fact p is common knowledge if all 
players know p, all players know that all players know p, all players know that all players know that all players know p, and so on ad 
infinitum.It is important to distinguish common knowledge from the situation of general knowledge in which all members of the group 
merely know the proposition to be true. explanations in terms of incomplete information and reputation-building cannot explain all violations 
of backward induction. These results suggest that a small proportion of people behave cooperatively or 
altruistically irrespective of any assumptions that they may hold about their co-players’ rationality or any 
attempt to bolster their own reputations. 
The typical results of Experimental Economics are high rates of contribution to the public goods at the 
beginning of the game and a gradual reduction in contributions towards the end of rounds until a null 
or quasi-null outcome is reached. 
As in Game Theory predictions, however, the final result is free riding. The most important variables 
involved in this drastic decrease of voluntary cooperation are identified in strategic behaviour of the 
agents and in learning processes about the rules, the payoffs and the structure of games. 
But the most significant findings are the highly cooperative behaviours that the agents carry out in the 
first phases of the game and which are uncommon in the strategic rationality perspective. 
In experiments, the rationality characterising agents is of a different type. Here, the rationality of the 
agents is bounded, and they are also subject to errors in making assessments linked to their social 
environment. This bounded rationality is not thus exclusively selfish: it is somehow interested in social 
and collective motives such as altruism, sense of group belonging, fear of social exclusion, reciprocity 
and imitation.  
Positing this type of rationality, experiments have shown atypical cooperative behaviour in the starting 
rounds  of  the  game,  with  a  total  absence  of  generalised  free  riding,  and  a  gradual  decline  of 
contributions in subsequent rounds: the experimental perspective is interesting particularly in that it 
stresses the importance of not economically measurable factors and allows one to discriminate among 
many concurrent explanations. 
Briefly, the experimental findings to explain cooperation are typically organized into three categories: 
decision errors and confusion; strategic cooperation rising from selfish motivations; “other-regarding” 
preferences related to kindness, fairness, reciprocity, warm glow and social ties
6. The hypothesis of 
confusion,  simply  states  that  the  agents  cooperate  because  they  do  not  understand  the  dominant 
strategy; strategic cooperation means that the agents cooperate because they understand that if all other 
agents will contribute, they can obtain higher payoffs; finally, voluntary cooperation is promoted by 
social motives to which experimental literature collectively refers as kindness or altruism.  
All these concomitant factors have as consequence that the rationality of the subjects involved in 
experimental analysis is bounded and produces collective results that, like those produced by Game 
Theory, are not Pareto-optimal. 
                                                 
6 The Experimental Economics literature on voluntary production of public goods has dealt widely with this subject and has also included 
consideration of exogenous variables such as the number and gender of subjects, incentives for cooperation, the presence or absence of 
thresholds and repetition, the initial information structure, the level of altruism, loyalty or friendship in a group, as well as variables 
reflecting the legal framework such as whether subjects may communicate and how, etc. For a complete review of this literature, see 
Raimondi (2009, b).    
1.3. Computational rationality 
 
The question of how agents interact adapting their behaviour to achieve a collective goal is strongly 
influenced  by  the  characteristics  of  the  agents’  rationality.  In  this  paper  I  attempt  to  measure  the 
outcome  and  the  dynamics  of  collective  action  assuming  that  the  agents  are  characterised  by 
computational rationality.  
With computational rationality, agents neither make errors nor are affected by confusion: they are able 
to calculate and assess their payoffs with no margin of error, to compare the present payoffs with those 
obtained in the previous rounds of the game and to make choices of contribution and investment 
exclusively on the basis of this assessment.  
Computational  rationality  excludes  any  type  of  strategies  or  social  motives  affecting  choices  and 
represents the basic and more innovative element of this model.  
In comparison with the bounded rationality of experimental models, computational rationality has the 
clear aim of overcoming the limits imposed by social motives and relational influences, as well as the 
limits imposed by confusion, i.e. the difficulty of calculating payoffs and understanding strategies. 
Indeed,  the  comparison  with  strategic  rationality  is  more  complex  and  critical.  Computational 
rationality  is  not  just  a  simplified  kind  of  rationality  arrived  at  by  ignoring  important  conditions 
characterising  social  dilemmas:  rather,  it  intends  to  correct  or  eliminate  some  of  the  weaknesses 
inherent in the conceptual framework where strategic rationality acts.   
These weaknesses, which can be traced to an analysis by Luce and Raiffa (1957) of the “backward 
induction paradox” in the finitely repeated PD, appear to show that strategic rationality and common 
knowledge  imply  self-defeating  behaviour  in  certain  mutually  interdependent  decision  situations 
involving sequential choices. 
A strategically rational agent, in fact, knows the payoff structure perfectly, so that he also knows that 
only  coordination  in  collective  action  leads  to  a  Pareto-optimal  outcome.  However,  his  strategic 
behaviour leads to defection from the common objective, producing an economic outcome that is 
worse than it would be otherwise. 
Empirical evidence suggests that human decision makers do not always follow the backward induction 
path even when they are capable of understanding the logic of the argument
7.  
Note that this involves an element of incomplete information rather than incomplete rationality on the 
part of the players: the players are assumed to be strategically perfect rational, and it is the information 
rather than the rationality assumptions that are relaxed. 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982). They showed that two rational PD players who each believe that there is 
a small probability that the other player is irrational will deviate from the prescriptions of backward induction in an attempt to influence 
the other player by building their reputations for cooperativeness. Computational  rationality  removes  the  inherent  weaknesses  relaxing  the  assumption  of  complete 
information and allows the agent to assess only the economic efficiency of available alternatives. This 
prompts behaviour that leads to the best outcome according to the agent’s own evaluation. We can 
define this sort of rationality as “pure rationality”, in the sense that it is purified from informative 
weaknesses affecting the agents in forming their expectations.  
 
 
2. Theoretical and simulation models 
 
In this Section I present the model and the structure of agent-based simulations. 
 
2.1 The voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) 
 
The  agent-based  model  outlined  here  has  the  same  structure  as  a  typical  public  good  game  in 
experimental  models.  Its  aim  is  to  assess  the  outcome  in  a  collective  process  of  a  system  where 
emotional  and  environmental  factors  typically  influencing  individual  choices  are  “neutralised.” 
Procedural  behaviour  is  based  exclusively  on  the  correct  assessment  of  the  agents’  own  previous 
actions.  
As stated above, Game Theory predicts an outcome of complete free riding, while the typical result of 
Experimental Economics is a high rate of contribution to the public good at the beginning of the 
experiment and a gradual reduction in contributions over time until a null or quasi-null outcome is 
reached.  
The model used here is based on a model typically used in Experimental Economics (Andreoni, 1995) 
where agents have the free choice of allocating their resources to either public or private investments.  
I now present in detail the basic framework of the linear public goods game (LPGG
8) with voluntary 
contribution mechanism (VCM). 
In a LPGG both the production function of the public good and the payoffs are linear. We have a 
group of subjects endowed with amounts of “tokens” that can either be kept (private investment) or 
contributed (public good). Subjects play the same game for a finite number of periods. In each period, 
every subject is endowed with an endowment of wi. The subject must then divide this endowment 
between a contribution to a private account (yi ) that yields a constant return to the private investor 
only, and a contribution to a public account (ci ) where consumption benefits accrue to all group 
members.  
                                                 
8 The LPGG was introduced by Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984) and has been widely used in subsequent experimental literature. For a 
complete analysis of the use of LPGG in Experimental Economics, see Zelmer (2003). In formal terms, we have two goods, a private good (Y )and a public good (X) and a set of N 
individuals:  
 
n = 1,….N. 
 
Each individual receives the endowment wi at the beginning of each round and the public good is 
realised by a production function given by: 
 
) C ( g X =   
 
where C is the total amount of the contributions to the public good, that is  
 
∑ = = N ,.., 1 i i c C , 
 
and  i c is the individual contribution to the public good given by 
 
i i i y w c − =  . 
 
For each subject, the individual earnings from the public good are  
 
C ) N / ( ) C ( g xi α = =  , 
 
where  α is the rate of return on the public good and  N / α  is the marginal per capita return of 
contribution (MPCR)
9. 
Each agent has the following payoff function: 
 
i i i i i x py ) x , y ( U + =  
 
where p is the marginal return to a unit of private good. So, the marginal rate of substitution between 
the private and the public good is given by: 
 
) y / U /( ) c / U ( M i i i ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ =   
 
                                                 
9 MPCR depends on the number of subjects in the group: given N for a group, MPCR is also a constant. In a LPGG, both the parameters α and p are constant and chosen to create a social dilemma:  
 
α/N < p < α 
 
Typically, in experiments parameterized in this way, the agent maximizing the utility function, subject to 
a budget constraint ((wi = yi + ci ) and a non-negativity constraint (ci ≥ 0), has a dominant strategy that is 
to contribute nothing to the public good. The Nash Equilibrium is thus to invest in the private good 
(full free riding). In contrast, for the group as a whole the Pareto efficient outcome is to invest all 
endowments in the public account. 
In order to identify variables that increase and decrease cooperation levels, previous research studies 
have made various parameters and factors to vary in the respective models of voluntary production of 
public goods. Some of these factors have big effects on the rate of contribution while others have little 
explicative power.  
Some variables in fact do not have a definite impact either because evidence is ambiguous or because 
other  partially  reveals  factors  cannot  be  separated  out.  For  these  and  other  reasons,  the  issue  of 
collective action and coordination is particularly suitable for treatment with ACE, which can include 
and assess elements typically excluded from traditional models.  
 
2.2 The agent-based model 
 
This work focuses on the definition of computational rationality characterising agents. 
I  define  that  agents,  at  every  instant,  can  perfectly  calculate  their  own  payoffs  and  positively  or 
negatively  assess  the  outcome  of  previously  made  choices.  If  their  actions  are  not  guided  by 
assumptions on others’ behaviour, by expectations on the future outcome of collective action (i.e., 
typically, collective action failure), by social motives or by behaviours that are conform with the group 
behaviour, they will continuously adapt their actions solely on the basis of actual costs and benefits.  
I find evidence that, even where the differential between public and private profit levels is low and the 
starting population is heterogeneous, the dynamics of the system will work towards a high level of 
contribution to the public good on the part of almost all agents. 
The  computational  model  can  exclude  the  above  cited  determining  factors  of  experimental  work: 
confusion, altruism and strategic behaviour. Virtual agents are modelled as computationally rational 
entities: they “only” can calculate correctly the level of incentive and payoff right from the first step. By 
definition, they are not altruistic: they act only on the basis of their assessment of their own individual 
result from each decision. In the same way, the agents’ behaviour can be defined as “neutrally strategic” 
rather than opportunistic. The model
10 counts N private generic agents who interact for a length of time that is not fixed a priori.  
Agents are heterogeneous in their initial endowments of the private good, and this heterogeneous 
nature is private information for each agent. 
At each step of the game, an agent decides how much of his endowment to invest in the private 
market,  for  positive  individual  profits,  and  how  much  to  invest  in  the  public  good,  which  yields 
collective profit equally divided between the group members
11.  
Agents are placed on a lattice which measures 40x40 for a total of 1600 virtual agents. The dynamics of 
the system is deterministic (myopic): at each instant in time, each agent only knows the state of the 
system in the preceding period and chooses his investment assuming the future to be identical with the 
present.  
The model has the following parameters and functions:  
 
p = profit rate on private good;  
α = profit rate on public good; 
q = technological constraint on realisation of good; 
fi = allocation algorithm that assigns to each agent in the lattice a class of contribution valid for the 
initial period (t=0); 
i
0 k = initial characteristic of each agent determined by function fi ; 
 
The variables used in the algorithms and in the definition of the rules of interaction are as follows: 
 
n = 1,…,N number of agents; 
g = number of agents aggregated;  
i
t w = amount of endowment (10 “tokens”) in each period; 
i




t y w −  = amount of endowment invested in public good; 
CA , i
t π = instant payoff from “collective action”; 
IA , i
t π = instant payoff from “individual action”; 
 
i
t Π = total instant payoff = IA , i
t
CA , i
t π π +  
 
where:  
                                                 
10 See also the Appendix  for further information on simulation design. 
11 For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that costs of searching and aggregation between individuals are too low to matter. n
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First, I attempt to test the effects of different kinds of spatial interactions among the agents (global or 
local interactions
12). Interaction dynamics in these simulations can have two structures: (1) a simplified 
global interaction structure, in which each of the N agents virtually interacts at the same time with all 
other agents and (2) a local interaction structure, in which each of the agents “locally” interacts with a 
subset of agents, on the basis of the following rules. 
At the first step, t = 0, each agent “asks” his first and second neighbours
13 how much they will invest in 
the public good. If the answer is an amount greater than zero which, in conjunction with the agent’s 
own  amount,  satisfies  the  minimum  requirement  q,  the  two  agents  form  a  group.  Otherwise  they 
remain isolated agents.  
In the simulated model, for simplicity’s sake, no technological constraint is imposed on the realisation 
of a public good so that the value of q is always zero: hence, to form a group, it is sufficient that the 
answer of the neighbour is greater than zero. 
In the same step, aggregated agents invest in the public good the share of endowment determined by 
the initial distribution, and isolated agents invest their entire share in the private market. The first step 
ends with the calculation and payment of individual and group payoffs. 
In  each  subsequent  step  (t  >  0),  the  same  mechanism  of  questioning  is  at  work:  all  agents,  both 
aggregated and isolated, continue to question their first and second neighbours, incorporating these 
agents
14 into existing “groups”
15, creating new groupings or continuing to pursue individual action.  
But in all subsequent steps there also exists a second procedural rule governing the evaluation of the 
outcome of previous actions: the agent assesses the “opportunity cost” obtained from previous action. 
                                                 
12 Local interactions are those which occur in the real world, where individuals interact with a proper subset of agents in the system 
rather than directly with the whole. 
13 The first and second neighbours of each agent number eight in all. The selection mechanism for questioning is always random. Second 
neighbours are also considered: these are agents positioned at corners and are useful because, in every round, they guarantee that there is 
at least one agent free to questioning for each agent. 
14 This mechanism also allows for the questioning among groups. If an agent from one group at random questions an agent belonging to 
another group, and the two agents’ contributions are greater than zero, the result is the aggregation of two whole groups.    
15 The formation of groups has no effect on the final result but is rather the consequence of collective action which started up locally 
because of the intrinsic characteristics of the rules of interaction. It is seen in the association of agents who agree to produce one and the 
same public good. In abstract terms, the public good produced by one group at a particular point of the lattice is the same type as a good 
produced at another point.  Following this “opportunity cost” rule, the agents assess the opportunity cost of investing their tokens 
alternatively in the public good or in the private good by calculating this value: 
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that is the difference between the (actual) payoff obtained from contributing   ) y w ( i
t
i
t −  to the public 
good and the payoff that they should obtained from contributing the same  ) y w ( i
t
i
t − to the private 
good at the time t. Note that (
i A0 = 0). 
An alternative rule of assessing is the “net benefit” rule: the agents only must assess if the previous 
action produced a result greater than zero, i.e. if the difference between the benefit and the cost of 
cooperation is greater than zero
16. 
In these simulations, I decided to use the “opportunity cost” rule in order to make the comparison 
between the public and the private investment for the agents more specific
 17.  
In deciding what to do at time “t+1” the agent has to take into account relative, rather than absolute 
variations, so that his own  i
t A  is compared with the  i
1 t A −  (the result obtained in the previous step)
18.  
Lastly, the model also specifies the variable ∆(t) which represents the variation of the action each 
individual undertakes over the public good investment in the preceding period. ∆(t) may take only the 
values +1 and -1.  
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t − − = π . 
17 Series of simulations were also carried out using the rule based on net benefit: the results were qualitatively similar to those produced by 
the presented model. 
18 It did not appear appropriate to measure i
t A in absolute terms, that is, without comparing it with its value in previous steps and 
supposing that at each step the agent assesses whether  i
t A is positive or otherwise, as this could distort and amplify incentives for 
cooperation. Note  that  a  rule  of  “progressive  disinvestment”  is  introduced:  subjects  gradually  reduce  their 
investments in the public good until they completely disappear, if they obtain two consecutive absolute 
negative results (loss on investment)
19.  
This rule is introduced to provide incentives for individual action, and appears to be consistent with 
what happens in the real world: subjects become more risk-averse when they meet persistent negative 
results in the short term, while they tend to stop “negative” investments when their perception of loss 
lasts over time, even where a long term view might favour holding on to an investment. The rule is 
intended to represent what typically happens on a stock exchange when, for example, investors prefer 
to sell stocks and shares that have made frequent losses over a short period. 
From the point of view of endogenous mutation, i. e. of changes caused by the rules internal to the 
model, we register not only creation of groups but also group disruption: when a group finds itself with 
an  average  level  of  contributions  below  the  constraint  q  (which  means,  in  this  case,  when  all  the 
members of group are contributing zero), the group breaks up and the agents participating in the group 
become individual agents once again.  
In the subsequent steps, the agents start to question their neighbours again and may form new groups. 
In each new round of questioning after group disruptions, the level of contribution of the agents 
concerned  is  no longer  the  random  level assigned  by  function  fi at  the  start,  but  the  last  level  of 
contribution to the public good made by the group before its breakup. 
The next table summarizes the basic “working” of the model. 
 
                                                 
19 If they obtain two consecutive relatively negative results, but greater than zero in absolute terms, they do not disinvest but make further 
attempts to invert their action. Tab. 1: Action and phase progression 
 
Steps  Actions  
Phase 1￿ Every agent asks to a neighbour if he will contribute to the public good: 
- with positive response: aggregation occurs 
- with negative response: agents remain isolated 
Step 0 
(t = 0) 
Phase 2 ￿ All agents invest their own endowment in the public good and in the private 
market according to their distribution class 
- The isolated agents invest their entire endowment in the private market 
- The payoffs are calculated and updated (both individual and group payoffs, for  
isolated and aggregated agents) 
Phase 1 ￿ Every agent evaluates the net payoff received at the previous step and decides 
whether to increase or to decrease the contribution to the public good in this step. 
Phase 2 ￿ Every agent (isolated or otherwise) asks to an isolated neighbour or someone who 
is part of a different group 
- with positive response: aggregation occurs 




Phase 3 ￿ All agents invest their own endowment in the public good and in the private 
market according to the distribution class (if isolated) or according to the decision that is 
made (if aggregated) 
- Isolated agents invest their entire endowments in the private market 
- All payoffs are calculated and updated (both individual and group payoffs, for;  







The aim of this Paper is to design an agent-based model to study the evolution of cooperation among 
private  agents  taking  part  in  collective  projects.  These  agents  are  characterised  by  computational 
rationality. The question is the following: if the agents’ behaviour is not influenced by expectations 
both on the others’ behaviour and social factors, will they contribute to the public good, even where 
there is not a big difference between the rates of return on the public and the private good? 
Three series of simulations have been carried out. The first series aims at verifying the main hypothesis, 
that is to establish whether agents having computational rationality, acting on the basis of rules that take into account only updated individual payoffs at each step, can reach high levels of voluntary 
contribution.  
I also test the sensitivity of the model to initial parameters (i.e. the algorithm allotting the individual 
characteristics and the rates of return on both the private and the public good investment).  
The next series tests the model’s robustness by means of an empirical validation test: it tests how the 
system responds to “noise”, that is the possibility of error and “confusion” (with regard to rules of 
behaviour) on the part of agents.  
The  last  series  introduces  free  riding  into  the  model  in  order  to  test whether  and  to what extent 
opportunistic agents produce the failure of collective action and no production of public goods, as 
happens in experimental models and Game Theory. 
 
3.1 Contribution levels, profit differentials and the heterogeneous nature of initial characteristics  
 
The main result of the first series of simulations is that in the model there occurs an extremely high 
level of voluntary contribution to the public good. This is an interesting result in terms of both the final 
outcome and the dynamics through which it is reached.  
The agents follow exclusively the rule according to which they assess the payoffs of the most recent 
rounds only and thereby “adapt” their next actions on the basis of the individual satisfaction. They go 
through a short period of attempts of action inversion; then, as a result of the higher financial payoffs 
that  can  be  obtained  from  the  public  investment,  they  gradually  and  systematically  synchronise, 
“directing themselves” towards the increase of contributions to the public good and, consequently, 
towards high average contribution levels. 
Note however that the profit differential between public and private goods is not great and that the 
level of public profit assumed in the simulation model is lower than that used in experimental models: 
in  fact,  in  experimental  models  the  profit  rate  on  public  goods  is  usually  twice  that  of  private 
investment  (α  =  50%),  and  sometimes  even  higher.  In  my  simulations  the  profit  rate  on  public 
investment is only 30% higher than that on private good (α = 30%). 
I check whether different degrees of heterogeneity in the initial population may influence the outcome. 
Replications of the simulation showed that there exists a critical threshold of rate of return on the 
public good, α* and when this threshold is exceeded, different initial distributions of characteristics do 
not affect the final result. In this series of simulations, α* = 0,28 and it is lower than the rate of return 
traditionally used both in Experimental Economics models and in my other simulations: this is useful in 
not excessively reducing the incentives to free riding and in assessing that high observed levels of 
cooperation are not twisted by a greater differential between the rates of return.  Therefore,  with  the  purpose  of  giving  virtual  agents  characteristics  as  similar  as  possible  to  those 
revealed a posteriori in typical experiments on public goods, I restricted the support of the distribution 
function of the initial characteristics to the [3 – 7] interval. 
The main result of the model is robust and independent of initial parameters. Agents who are perfectly 
able to calculate incentives and payoffs without error or confusion, without altruistic or opportunistic 
motives,  contribute  to  the  supply  of  public  goods  at  a  level  between  85  and  95  percent  of  their 
endowment.  
Moreover this form of collective action does not decline over time, but rather it makes steady through a 
cyclical  repetition:  in  each  simulation,  the  system  shows  four-period  cycles  in  which  cooperation 
increases and decreases and, finally, after about 20 steps, becomes steady. 
These cycles probably occur because there are lower and upper limits to what the agents can invest: no 
agent is allowed contribute with tokens worth less than zero or worth more than the maximum current 
endowment of ten units, so that cyclical limit states are created. This condition also tested in the 
validation tests in order to prove it does not affect the simulation results.  
This  result  needs  to  be  interpreted  bearing  in  mind  that  the  agents  are  involved  in  a  process  of 
asynchronic  and  double mutation.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  due  to  individual  heterogeneity  (i.e.  the 
different characteristic distributed in the initial round that defines the agents’ capacity to contribute); on 
the other hand, it is also due to the temporary heterogeneity. Temporary heterogeneity is shown in the 
dynamics of communication and aggregation of agents so that they are in fact making decisions on 
different time planes.  
At each moment there are some agents increasing their own contribution at the same time as other 
agents are reducing theirs: when the system reaches its stability, all agents are contributing around the 
80% of their endowments and they do not subsequently modify this level.  
Sensitivity tests were carried out by way of numerous simulations of the model, by changing individual 
characteristics and simulating the simplest model (with global interaction structure), that is the same 
model  presented  in  the  previous  section,  but  with  the  agents  not  placed  on  a  lattice,  having  no 
communication between each other, and having only to choose their levels of contribution to the 
public good contemporaneously and regardless of group membership.  
In the first place, to study the impact of different distributions of initial agents’ characteristics on 
contribution levels, all possible uniform distribution functions were tested, that is to say, all possible 
combinations where the  i
0 k ’s are selected with a discrete probability in the interval [0,10]. I tested other 
intervals of distributions in other simulations, and I verified that the initial heterogeneity has a neutral 
effect on the outcomes.  The relation of the different distributions
20 to the various levels of profit on the public investment α 
was thus identified in order to test its potential influence on results.  
Figure 1 shows that, above a certain threshold of profit on public investment, the model is not in fact 
sensitive to changes in the distribution parameter. 
 




The graph shows systems of 1600 agents. In these simulations, after a short period of time (10-20 
rounds), in which there occur “four” period cycles, the system synchronizes toward a high level of 
cooperation.  
The average contribution to the public good is represented by colour and is obtained by calculating the 
average individual contribution once the system make itself steady.    
The graph shows the critical threshold of profit on the public good, a function of the initial conditions,  
given by (1+α*) = 1,28. Below this threshold the average contribution is practically zero (blue zone), 
while above it most agents invest in public goods with an average contribution of eight  ) y w ( i
t
i
t − = 8 
(red zone). 
Where the initial characteristics are uniform for all agents (∆ i
0 k =0), the outcome is full cooperation
21. 
This  is  predictable  given  that  the  agents  start  the  game  at  the  same  time  with  identical  positive 
                                                 
20 For the purposes of verification, the variable defining variability in initial distribution was defined as follows: 
 ∆ i
0 k =   i
0 k p -  i
0 k m  where   i
0 k p represents the maximum value of the distribution, 10, and  i
0 k m represents the possible difference 
with respect to the average value of 5 occurring from game to game.  contributions and increase their levels of contribution each time until all their resources are invested in 
public goods.  
All other initial configurations produce a curve in contribution defined by public profits. For levels 
between (1+ α*) = 1.1 and (1+ α*) = 1.28 it shows an increase in the average contribution as the 
variability in initial distribution ∆ i
0 k increases. Once the critical threshold α* is passed, there are almost 
full contribution levels to the public good. 
It is interesting to look at the dynamics leading to this final state.  Figure 2 shows the evolution over 
time of the average, minimum and maximum level of contribution. 
 
Fig.2: Average contribution and minimum and maximum contributions to the public good (realisation of public goods).  
 
 
The graph shows that during the transition period, the difference between minimum and maximum 
contributions  declines  rapidly  until  the  point  where  all  agents  are  “synchronised”  and 
contemporaneously increase their contribution to the public good. When some of the agents reach the 
maximum possible contribution,  ) y w ( i
t
i
t − = 10, the synchronised system stabilises itself.  
Note that in the first phase, where maximum contribution is falling, important changes in behaviour are 
caused by progressive disinvestment: when agents investing heavily in the public good repeatedly obtain 
negative results, they disinvest rapidly, thereby making the average contribution more uniform with less 
cooperative agents “obliged” to contribute.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
21 Only in the case of a uniform initial distribution with 0 for all i , does the game simply end at the first step with complete absence of 
contribution to the public good. Lastly, note that in the final state there are different levels of contribution, between ten and six, which 
are all giving agents positive results.  
Table 2 summarises my main findings. 
 
Tab. 2: Benchmark simulation in “neutral environment” 
 
Characteristics    
 Support of the distribution function of k
i   3 - 7 
(1+α) = profit from the public good  1.3 
(1+p) = profit from the private good  1 
q = technological constraint  0 
% of the agents in groups  100% 
Average contribution of group (as percentage of endowments)  85% - 95% 




3.2 Levels of voluntary contribution and “errors” in the system  
 
In the second series of simulations, I assessed the stability of results given that the 
i
t k s are constrained 
to  lie  in  the  range  [0  ,10]  due  to  the  impossibility  of  negative  investments  and  the  limitation  of 
individual resources.  
I introduced random noise during some simulations: each agent i, with probability ρ
i, can make a 
random move 
i
t ∆  which does not follow the standard procedural rules. 
For low levels of noise, the results were confirmed and proved stable. But the noise pushed the critical 
threshold α* somewhat higher (see Fig. 4). 
Figure 3 shows the simulation with the same starting conditions as the first series but with random 




Fig. 3: Average contribution to the public good as a function of initial characteristics of the population and profit from 
public good and with a 2% probability of individual errors in choice. 
                                                 
22 Noise with probability of ρi =0,02 means that 2% of the total population will make random errors in their actions.   
 
 
Note  that  a  low  level  of  noise  completely  eliminates  the  peculiar  behaviour  occurring  in  the 
deterministic case of constant and uniform distribution (total cooperation).  
With higher noise levels, with probabilities higher than ρ
ι = 0.05, the results no longer depend on 
starting conditions and the critical threshold α* rises noticeably to levels even higher than one.  
In this simulation, for any initial distribution of characteristics, there tend to exist two distinct sets of 
solutions:  no  contribution  and  contribution  by  almost  all  agents.  Figure 4  shows  the  incidence  of 
different levels of noise on the results, that is the relationship between parameters ρ
i  and α* , and how 
cooperation increases as noise and the critical profit level rise. 




The  absence  of  cooperation  is  the  blue  -  area.  Average  levels  of  contribution  to  the  public  good 
between  ) y w ( i
t
i
t − = 4 and  ) y w ( i
t
i
t − = 9 are shown by blue – red shading. The diagram shows that 
as  noise  increases  there  is  always  a  transition  period  when  contributions  tend  to  standardise,  and 
subsequently a phase where the agents synchronise and systematically increase their contribution to the 
public good.  
When the maximum level of contribution is reached, there is another four-period cycle during which 
the average contribution alternatively rises and falls.  
The following graphs show the complex dynamics resulting from an increase in noise and the wider 
variety  in  contribution  behaviour.  In  particular,  the  graph  shows  the  simulation  where  α=0,5  and 
ρi=0,01. We can observe that there are agents who make very little contributions: 23 agents contribute 
only with one token and 8 agents are completely free riders. 
 Fig. 5: Average and maximum contribution to the public good as a function of time and with 2% probability of 




Fig. 6: Average and maximum contribution to the public good as a function of time and with 7% probability of 
individual error.  
 
  
3.3  Levels of voluntary contribution and free riding among agents 
 
The third simulation aims at showing that opportunistic strategic behaviour is the true determinant of 
collective action failure, once factors of confusion and altruism are neutralised. I introduce a genotype 
of free riding which is exogenous and systematic. 
A  proportion  of  agents  are  characterised  by  “unconditioned”  opportunistic  behaviour,  where 
“unconditioned” means a priori and exogenously set. These agents, whatever may happen during the 
simulation, defect from the collective goal and,  anticipating its failure, try to obtain the highest possible 
individual benefit for themselves immediately.  
A parameter Fh  is added to the model, at time h, to introduce a percentage of free riders exhibiting 
right from h a gradually opportunistic strategic behaviour. Fh is the percentage of agents in the system 
that, by time h always decreases its contribution to the public good by one unit at every step. As in 
experimental economics models this leads to a gradual fall in contribution levels and eventually to the 
failure of collective action. 
Figure 7 shows contribution to the public good as a function of the proportion of strategic agents Fs 
and the yield of public investment.  
Note  that  the  behaviour  dynamics  of  non-opportunistic  agents  are  identical  to  those  occurring  in 
simulations without noise and with the critical rate of return on the public goods α*: these dynamics 
are also characterised by four-period cycles before synchronization.  
By introducing Fs the system exhibit a dynamics of cooperation only when α* is higher than a critical 
threshold given by the identity (1+α∗)/(1-Fs)=1,15, that is 
 
α∗ = 0,15−1,15 Fs 
 Fig. 7: Contribution to the public good as a function of the percentage of free riders in the population and the yield of 





In this case it was possible to derive analytically the critical threshold of free riding agents which leads 
to system failure in relation to the profit rate on public investment.  
The curve represents the theoretical phase diagram and can be analytically derived by considering that 
the system with Fh strategic agents is equivalent to a system where (1-Fh)  agents act according to the 
usual rules.   
The critical threshold of the rate on public goods is lower than α* and increases when the presence of 
non contributing strategic agents also increases.  
Figure 8 shows what happens in the model when contribution to the public good is close to zero.  





In this case, there is an initial transition period when the largest contributors gradually disinvest. But the 
low  differential  between  profits  from  public  and  private  investments  prevents  the  system  from 
synchronizing and the agents from increasing their contributions to the public good.  
Table 3 summarises the main results of this series of simulations.  
 
Tab. 3: Simulation with opportunistic agents (hypothesis of free riding). 
 
Characteristics     
Support of the distribution function of k
i   3 – 7 
(1+α) = profit from the public good   1.3 
(1+p) = profit from the private good   1 
q = technological constraint   0 
Fh= % of free riding agents   20% 
% of agents in groups  0 
Time for reaching the steady state   About 20 rounds 
 4. Conclusions 
 
This  Paper  presents  simulations  obtained  by  means  of  an  agent-based  model  where  agents  search 
solutions for collective action in order to provide a public good. My aim was to verify the hypothesis 
that computational rationality, in the absence of errors and conditioning, and taking exclusively into 
account the efficiency of own options in individual investment, can lead to the success of collective 
action.   
The Paper illustrates the basic initial assumptions, the procedural rules regulating agent interaction and 
the preliminary results of a series of simulations. 
My  findings  show  a  varied  picture.  There  is  a  real  possibility  of  collective  action  succeeding  at 
significant levels where there is an absence of strategic behaviour and other factors influencing the 
results  of  experimental  studies.  The  introduction  of  opportunistic  behaviour  on  the  part  of  some 
agents, however, leads to the same results as obtained in Experimental Economics: agents opt for 
selfish behaviour and collective action fails. 
In both cases, a higher expected level of profit from collective action, or a higher differential between 
profits  on  public  and  private  investments,  can  influence  the  pace  of  coordination  and  grouping 
dynamics. But under a certain threshold the profit differential does not appear to influence the level 
and spread of cooperation.  
  Appendix  
 
1. The simulation model 
 
1.1  Individual Variables  
 A generic individual i placed in the lattice is characterized by: 
- pair of coordinates (x,y) that determines their position; 
- i coordinate for individual identification; 
- initial distribution in a contribution class; 
- colour to identify the agents’ status; 
- a Boolean coordinate “Isjoined”: true for agents aggregated in groups, otherwise false; 
- j coordinate identified by the aggregate that it is connected to (j = 0 if isolated); 
- d coordinate identified by the dimension of the aggregate that it is connected to (d = 1 if isolated); 
- pi(t) coordinate equal to the average instant payoff at the time t; 
- Pi(t) coordinate equal to the cumulative payoff at the time t; 
- action undertaken during the current step ; 
- part of the endowment invested in the private market; 
- part of the endowment invested in the public good. 
 
1.2  Group variables 
A generic group is generated by: 
- the union of two individuals; 
- the consolidation of a group and an isolated individual; 
- the consolidation of two groups. 
A generic group is characterized by: 
- k coordinate identified by the aggregate; 
- colour to identify their status; 
- pi coordinate (t) equal to the instant payoff at the time t;  
- value of the average allotment contribution. 
 
1.3  Simulation parameters 
The simulation is characterized by the following customizable user parameters: 
- minimal technological constraints for the public good; 
- private market return rate; 
- public good return rate ; 
- parameter for saving data related to graphs. Questionnaire post ACE study
23. 
 
1. Links with the literature 
•  Is your model based on some existing model in the simulation literature?     T 
•  Is your model based on some existing model in the non-simulation literature?   T 
•  Does the paper contain a survey on the theoretical background of the phenomenon that is 
investigated? 
T Long  
T Brief  
T None 
•  Does the paper contain a survey of the relevant simulation and non-simulation models? 
      T Long  
      T Brief  
      T None 
 
2. Structure of the model 
•  Have you clarified: 
• the goal of your model (empirical or theoretical)             T 
• whether the implications are testable with real data            T 
• the evolution of the population (static or dynamic) 
 if static: the total number of agents               T 
 if dynamic: birth and death mechanisms             T 
• the treatment of time (discrete or continuous)             T 
• the treatment of fate (deterministic or stochastic)             T 
•  Have you classified your model with respect to: 
• the topological space (no space, nD lattices, graphs…)           T 
• the type of agent behaviour (optimising, satisfying..)           T 
• the interaction structure (localized or non-localized)           T 
• the coordination structure (centralized or decentralized)          T 




                                                 
23 Leombruni, Richiardi, Saam and Sonnessa (2006). •  Have you clarified the objective of the analysis (full exploration or  
partial exploration)?                  T 
•  Have you clarified the focus of the analysis (equilibrium at micro level, 
equilibrium at macro-level, out-of-equilibrium)?            T 
•  Has statistical testing of the properties found in the artificial data been  
performed?                    T 
•  Are the parameters of the model been estimated / calibrated on real data?    T 
•  Has sensitivity analysis been performed?             T 




•  Is the presentation detailed enough to allow the replication of the 
experiment/results?                   T 
 
•  Have you used a simulation platform to implement your model?       T 
•  If any, have you clarified which simulation platform you have 
used?                      T 
•  Can the simulation be run online?               T 
•  Graphical presentation of the model structure: 
T UML diagrams (specify) 
T Other diagrams (specify) 
T None 
•  Code availability: 
T Web-site 
T Upon request  
T None 
•  Is your exploration performed only on a subset of the parameters’ space? If yes, 
please state why. 
•  Which kind of statistical analysis have you performed on the artificial data? 
T graphical 
T descriptive statistics 
T multivariate analysis (metamodelling) 
T stationarity / ergodicity tests on artificial time series 
T other (please specify)………………………………. •  If multivariate analysis / statistical tests have been performed, please list the 
methods you have used. 
•  Please put down all meaningful parameters that had to be initialized and indicate the method(s) 
you  used  for  estimation  or  calibration  (  (e.g.  beta:  calibrated/estimated  from  statistical 
data/empirical data collection).please indicate a reference for each method) 
•  Please mark those features that you tested for sensitivity. 
T Random seed variation  
T Variation in the level of data aggregation 
T Noise type and noise level variation  
T Variation in the decision processes and capabilities of the agents 
T Parameter variation  
T Variation of sample size (esp. small sample properties) 
T Temporal model variation (discrete to continuous time or from fixed  to random 
updating of cells) 
T other: …………………………… 
•  Please indicate the method(s) you applied for testing the model’s sensitivity on input 
variation (please give a reference for each method). 
•  Please state the type of validity that you claim for your model. 
•  Please  indicate  the  method(s)  you  applied  for  testing  the  model’s  validity  (please  give  a 
reference for each method). 
•  Comments on this questionnaire 
You have worked through this questionnaire that aims at increasing methodological 
rigour in agent-based social and economic simulation. Do you have any comments or 
recommendations for us that could improve this questionnaire? Bibliography 
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